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Abstract 
A generally accepted theorem in environmental economics is that an 
emission charge is the least-cost method for society to achieve a 
prescribed standard. But this assumes that no inefficiencies with 
respect to the undesired outputs occur at the level of the firm. 
However, in the real world firms do not operate efficiently, because of 
existing regulations, differences in availability of resources (e.g. 
management), and the adjustment costs involved if there are quasi-
fixed inputs. Therefore, the proposition that taxes are the least-cost 
method to achieve a prescribed standard can be challenged. 
1. Introduction 
One of the central concerns in environmental economics is to design 
reasonably cost-effective policies to control externalities. The fiscal 
and/or legislative instruments that can be used to attain standards 
serving as targets for environmental quality are evaluated. Under 
certain conditions taxes (and also marketable permits) turn out to be 
the least-cost method for society to achieve a given environmental goal 
(e.g. Baumöl and Oates, 1988; Pearce and Turner, 1990). The most 
important conditions required for this theorem to be valid are: (i) firms 
seek to minimize the private cost of producing outputs, (ii) no 
inefficiencies with respect to the undesired outputs occur at the level of 
the firm, and (iii) the production function is concave. This well-known 
theorem has been the subject of many empirical studies (for an 
overview see Tietenberg, 1990) which have compared the difference 
between the cost of a control and command system with the least-cost 
method. The excess costs of a control and command system turn out 
to be very large, the general conclusion is that the use of economic 
incentives should be promoted. 
In environmental economics it is a generally accepted theorem that 
a charge on emission is the least-cost method for society to achieve a 
prescribed standard. Various authors have commented on the 
conditions required for this theorem and doubts are raised with respect 
to the empirical studies that claim to support the theorems validity. The 
concavity of the production function has been challenged by Baumöl 
and Oates (1988). Baumöl (1991) argues that the empirical studies 
overestimate the cost savings offered by a system of fees, because 
they use linear programming but in reality the costs of environmental 
programmes are distinctly nonlinear. Taking the actual trading process 
into account Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991) show that the cost 
savings of marketable permits are much smaller than the cost-effective 
allocation suggests. 
In this paper the second assumption (that there are no 
inefficiencies in undesired outputs at the level of the firm) is 
investigated. Inefficiency has been a neglected topic in the analysis of 
charges, because empirical studies have always started from a 
normative approach. The use of linear programming models implies that 
charges work ideally. No allowances are made for inefficiencies. 
However, in practice many inefficiencies can occur with respect to the 
undesired outputs; an overview is presented in Section 2. The 
consequence of these inefficiencies is analysed in Section 3, where it is 
shown that taxes are no longer the least-cost method to attain a 
prescribed environmental standard1. Conclusions are drawn in Section 
4. 
2. Inefficiencies at the firm level 
In the literature on economic efficiency, efficiency is broken down into 
two multiplicative components: technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency. Technical efficiency is defined as the distinction between 
maximum output and a given set of inputs. Technical inefficiency is 
mostly caused by limitations in fixed factors, such as management. A 
firm is allocatively efficient as long as the last unit of a resource that it 
employs yields as much as it would have yielded in an alternative 
employment (its opportunity cost). If the last unit of a resource yields 
less than what it would have produced elsewhere, the firm is wasteful. 
(Yotopoulos and Nugent, 1976: 71-77) 
In this section three cases of economic inefficiency with respect to 
undesirable outputs will be discussed. The first case is a study in which 
undesirable outputs are explicitly distinguished. Sufficient data are 
rarely available for this, therefore two additional cases will be analysed, 
one where the pollutant is related to the output and one where the 
pollutant is related to a quasi-fixed input. 
The first case relates to two studies done by Fare et al. (1989, 
1992). In both studies 30 paper mills operating in the United States in 
1976 were analysed. The mills use pulp, together with capital, labour 
and energy, to produce paper. In the process of producing the desired 
output of paper, undesirable pollutants are generated: biochemical 
oxygen demand and total suspended solids in the wastewater are 
increased, and sulphur oxides and particulates are emitted. These mills 
were operating under some environmentally-oriented regulations. In 
their earlier (1989) study, Fare and his colleagues measured the 
technical efficiency of the different mills. The mills differ in efficiency, 
even when undesirable outputs are taken into account. In the later 
A complete evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of charges is beyond 
the scope of this paper. For evaluating stochastic influences, see Baumöl and Oates 
(1988), for a treatment of other dimensions for judging policy instruments, see Böhm and 
Russell (1985). 
study (Fare et al., 1992) they calculated the shadow prices of outputs 
and undesirable outputs and found large variations in the shadow prices 
of effluents across mills. This suggests that the regulations prevailing in 
this industry did not yield an efficient allocation of resources. 
The second case relates to a situation where the undesired output 
is linearly related to a desired output (the same can be done when the 
undesired output is related to a variable input (e.g. fertilizer)). It is not 
unreasonable to assume that in the dairy-farming sector the nitrogen 
emission is linearly related to the output of milk. Helming et al. (1992) 
studied the dairy-farming sector in the Netherlands using panel data. 
Starting from a cost function approach and taking into account the 
endogeneity of the milk production they calculated the shadow prices 
of milk per farm. These shadow prices differ across farms: extensive 
dairy farms have higher shadow prices of milk than farms with very 
high intensive production. The latter farms have relatively more variable 
costs and can adjust to new production circumstances more easily. The 
allocative efficiency of these farms is greater than that of the extensive 
farms, although neither are optimal. 
The third case relates to the situation where the pollutant is related 
to a quasi-fixed input. This input can adjust only at some cost. The 
presence of a quasi-fixed input is an important source of imperfect 
adjustment in the short-run. Durable inputs such as capital are most 
likely to contribute to this form of costly and slower response by 
producers. This idea has been formalized and analysed in adjustment 
cost models (e.g. Denny et al., 1981; Epstein and Denny, 1983: 
Lopez, 1985; Vasavada and Chambers, 1986; Thijssen, 1992). It turns 
out that firms partly adjust the capital stock towards the desired level. 
The desired capital stock is given by the long-run equilibrium, where the 
marginal revenue of capital is equal to the marginal cost. However, 
firms adjust their plans (and hence the desired level of the capital stock) 
every year as prices change. Another type of dynamic model is the 
error correction model (e.g. Gilbert, 1986). In these models the change 
of the quasi-fixed inputs is related to changes in the exogenous vari-
ables and the lagged discrepancy between the quasi-fixed input and the 
target value of the quasi-fixed input. This target value itself also 
depends on the exogenous variables. Because in both types of dynamic 
model the real capital stock never reaches the desired level, the quasi-
fixed input is always allocated inefficiently. Even in dynamic models 
that explicitly take rational expectations into account there is 
divergence from the desired level (Dolado et al., 1991). 
These cases can be represented algebraically. In standard theory 
on the evaluation of charges, the starting point is cost minimizing 
behaviour; see Baumöl and Oates (1988: 165-169). As pointed out by 
Böhm and Russell (1985: 398) you can also start from a profit 
maximizing framework. Because quasi-fixed inputs are taken into 
account it is more convenient to assume that a firm is a profit-
maximizer2. Another assumption made is that the firm maximizes the 
short-run profits3. The short-run profit function of firm h can be written 
as 
77(p,r,w,zh,sh) = max {p y - r vh} - w zh (1 ) 
y,vh 
subject to the output constraint 
F(vh/yh,zh,sh) = 0 (2) 
where p is a vector of prices of the outputs, r is a vector of the prices 
of the variable inputs, w is a vector of prices of the quasi-fixed inputs, 
v is a vector of variable inputs, y is a vector of outputs, z is a vector of 
quasi-fixed inputs, s is a vector of undesired outputs, n is the short run 
profit function, F is an implicit function of inputs and outputs. The 
relation between the profit function and the pollutant depends on which 
of the three cases mentioned above is relevant. When the pollutant is 
an undesired output or linearly related to a desired output, the profit 
function is decreasing and concave in the pollutant. When the pollutant 
is related to a quasi-fixed input, the profit function is increasing and 
concave in the pollutant. 
In a short-run cost function with a quasi-fixed input the marginal cost of the quasi-
fixed input is negative. 
3
 We do not start from a long-run profit function, because as pointed out some of the 
inputs are quasi-fixed. Dynamic models starting from maximization of the (expected) 
present value of profit over an infinite horizon implicitly assume short-run profit-
maximizing behaviour (Thijssen, 1992). 
Because of the forms of inefficiency discussed above, the marginal 
profit of a pollutant before an environmental policy is implemented 
differs across the firms4 
3 /7(p,r,w/zi,si) 3 ^(pxw.Zj.Sj) 
b * b i ± j (3) 
3 S| 3 Sj 
The suffix b refers to the situation before an environmental policy is 
introduced. The consequence of this divergence will be analysed in the 
next section. 
3. The consequences of inefficiency 
One of the most important propositions in the economics of pollution 
control is that the cost of achieving a given reduction in emissions will 
be minimized if and only if the marginal costs of control are equalized 
for all emitters. Let us begin with a simplified case which makes it 
possible to use illustrations. Figure 1 demonstrates the proposition. 
Assume that the profit function is increasing and concave in the 
pollutant. 
In the case of the paper mills we refer to the current situation, where some kind of 
regulations already exist. 
Marginal 
cost 
Source 1 Source 2 
Emission of waste 
Figure 1 Efficient allocation of a pollutant (see text for 
explanation of symbols) 
For firm 1 the quantity of emission of waste increases from left to 
right, for firm 2 the opposite holds. Note that, in contrast with Tieten-
berg (1992:371), the horizontal axis represents the amount emitted. 
The curves represent the marginal profit of emission, but also represent 
the marginal (opportunity) cost of the emission reduction. MC, repre-
sents the marginal cost of the emission reduction for firm 1 and MC2 
does likewise for firm 2. In the absence of an environmental policy the 
waste discharged by source 1 is equal to 0,02, and we assume that 
source 2 discharge the same amount (020,). Assume that the goal of 
the environmental policy is to halve the total waste discharged by the 
two sources. The length of the horizontal axis is, therefore, equivalent 
to the target level of waste emission, each point represents some 
different combination of reduction by the two sources. The total cost of 
a emission reduction 02C by source 1 is equal to area B. The total cost 
of a emission reduction of 0,C by source 2 is equal to area A. The total 
cost of the emission reduction 0 ,0 2 by the two sources is equal to area 
A plus area B. At point C the allocation is cost-effective; any other 
allocation would result in a higher total control cost. An emission 
charge T on each unit of pollutant will lead to this point C# because 
both firms would control their emissions until the marginal control cost 
equalled the emission charge. 
The crucial assumption here is that in the absence of an environ-
mental policy the marginal cost of the emission of waste is equal to 
zero. It is assumed that in the absence of an environmental policy the 
emission of waste by source 1 is equal to C^Oj. Under the same 
assumption the emission of waste by source 2 is equal to 0 2 0, . This 
assumption is only valid when firms are economically efficient with 
respect to the emission of waste. 
As discussed in Section 2 it is more realistic to assume that the 
marginal costs of waste are not equal to zero in the absence of an 
environmental policy5. The consequence of this divergence is depicted 
in Figure 2. 
For most firms already some environmental restrictions are operating. In that case 
(e.g. the paper mills of Section 2) we analyze a further reduction of the pollutant than is 
implied by the current operating restrictions. 
Marginal 
cost 1 
Marginal 
cost 2 
Source 1 
D C 
Emission of waste 
Source 2 
Figure 2 The costs of taxes when some of the inputs are 
quasi-fixed (see text for explanation of symbols) 
The marginal cost of waste for source 1 is equal to 0,Y in the absence 
of an environmental policy. For source 2 this marginal cost is equal to 
02W. An emission charge of YZ on each pollutant from source 1 will 
lead to the waste discharged by source 1 being reduced by 02D6. The 
same tax (WX is equal to YZ) will lead to the waste discharged by 
source 2 being reduced by 0 ,0 . So the total reduction of the waste 
discharged is equal to 0 ,0 2 , which is the goal of the environmental 
policy. 
The uniform tax results in the desired reduction, but this policy is 
not cost-effective. By comparison with the least-cost policy it involves 
incurring additional cost (of area A). In this case regulation is even more 
6
 It is even doubtful if a tax will lead to the desired reduction, because the firm is not 
economic efficient. 
cost-effective. Halving the waste discharged by both sources will result 
in a point between D and C. Which policy is the most cost-effective 
depends on the position of the two marginal cost curves. 
We will now formalize the result depicted in Figure 2. Taxing the 
emission by a fixed rate per unit (T) increases the marginal profit of a 
pollutant by this tax. So both sides of equation (3) will increase by T 
3 i7(p,r,w,Zi,Sj) 3 //(p.r.w.z^Sj) 
„ + T *
 b + T i + j (4) 
3 Si 3 s, 
As can be concluded from equation (4) the marginal profit of a pollutant 
differs across firms after the tax T has been imposed. Therefore, 
charges are not the least-cost method for society to achieve a given 
environmental goal, when inefficiency is taken into account. Empirical 
research is needed to answer the following questions: 
- do the marginal costs of the waste discharged by sources equal to 
zero in the absence of an environmental policy? 
- what is the most cost-effective policy for achieving a prescribed 
standard: taxes or regulation? 
4. Conclusions 
One of the most important propositions in the economics of pollution 
control is that the cost of achieving a prescribed reduction in emissions 
will be minimized if and only if the marginal costs of control are 
equalized for all emitters. This leads to the well-known result that 
charges are the least-cost method for society to achieve a prescribed 
standard. However, a crucial assumption which has been made to reach 
this result is that the marginal costs of waste discharged are equal 
across firms before the charge is imposed. This is a reasonable 
assumption when firms work economically efficiently with respect to 
the undesired outputs. However, in the real world firms do not operate 
efficiently, because of existing regulations, differences in availability of 
resources (e.g. management), and adjustment costs when quasi-fixed 
inputs are involved. Therefore, the proposition that taxes are the least-
cost method of achieving a given standard is unsound. Empirical 
research is needed to find out which instrument is the most cost-
effective. 
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